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VIKING PLANETARY QUARANTINE PROCEDURES AND IMPLEMENTATION
Dr. Robert Howell
Martin Marietta Corporation
DR. HOWELL: As the previous two speakers have mentioned,
there has been a great deal of activity in planetary quarantine
for a number of years, and there is still a great deal of in-
terest in the subject for the outer-planet probes. Many of the
implementation techniques and methodology that was discussed by
Mr. Hoffman from JPL has been used on the Mariner programs and
applied to the Viking Project.
I would like to share with you some of the techniques and
methodology that have been used on Viking at the Martin Company
to implement the planetary quarantine requirements. As you well
know, Viking is the first U.S. project required to satisfy the
full intent of the international agreement, both from a sterile-
lander concept and planetary quarantine requirements on the or-
biter.
Implementation starts with requirements that are imposed by
NASA Headquarters and the Viking Project Office (Figures 9-12 and
9-13). These requirements establish the necessity to sterilize in
an inert gaseous environment; that the affluent gas coming from
the vehicle during the terminal-sterilization cycle be equal to or
less than twenty-five percent relative humidity at zero degrees
centigrade, 760 millimeters of mercury, and that lethality may
not be counted until the humidity requirement is achieved, and
the minimum lethal temperature is one hundred degrees centigrade.
As Mr. DeFrees from McDonnell Douglas indicated, additional
information is provided on the accepted standard test organism, D
values and Z values the probability of growth, probability of re-
lease, lethality of ultraviolet radiation, the microbial density
in non-metallic materials, and probably most important, the allo-
cation for the mission in question, all of which are needed to de-
termine the implementation approach for building and sterilizing
a vehicle.
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In addition to Planetary Quarantine, there may be a require-
ment or an allocation for biology. In the case of Viking there is
such a requirement and we must satisfy a probability of contamina-
tion of the biology instrument on-board by terrestrial organisms.
The basic approach for implementing Planetary Quarantine is
the same for any vehicle, Figure 9-14. You must start out with the
mission allocation and determine the potential contaminating events
associated with that mission. For Viking we must consider sterili-
zation, recontamination prior to launch, and recontamination after
launch, from the launch vehicle or orbiter. Some of the contaminat-
ing events prior to launch include propellant loading of the vehicle,
bioshield pressurant gas, propellant pressurization, and the RTG
cooling water which is used to cool the thermoelectric generators.
I will discuss only one of these events with you today - the
techniques and approaches we have implemented on Viking for steri-
lization.
There are three types of burden which must be considered when
sterilizing the lander: the organisms which are on the exterior
surfaces of the hardware, the organisms which are between mated
surfaces, and organisms within the materials that the components
in the system are constructed of. The latter is called "encap-
sulated burden." Each of these different burden types have dif-
ferent thermal death characteristics. The encapsulated burden is
the most resistant to dry-heat sterilization and requires the
longest period of time for reduction. Our approach is to achieve
the required encapsulated burden reduction at the component level
and to track the reintroduction of this burden type during the
assembly and buildup of components and the system. We have inte-
grated the planetary quarantine heat requirements with engineering
requirements for heat-compatibility testing on components to achieve
this reduction. (Figure 9-15 and 9-16)
There is information which is required before one can deter-
mine or specify the appropriate heat cycle for the hardware
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(Figure 9-17). To gather this information, thermal analyses are
performed to determine the slowest-responding point within that
component, the time lag between this point and the exterior of
the case, and the instrumentation required to verify the thermal
analyses during development testing. This information is used to
establish the component flight acceptance heating time required
to achieve the required encapsulated burden of reduction.
As shown on Figure 9-16, the development times and tempera-
tures are the same as those for qualification and are elevated both
in time and temperature over that which we expect flight hardware
to experience.
We use the terminal sterilization process to achieve the
necessary reduction of the surface and mated burden. Flight com-
ponents experience approximately the same cycle as they saw during
their flight-acceptance component heat-compatibility. System level
constraints of time and temperature have been established to en-
sure this is the case.
This process is shown schematically in Figure 9-18. A thermal
analysis is performed which establishes the requirements for com-
ponent testing. The component-development test results are used
to verify the thermal analysis and make corrections as necessary.
And then we perform the component flight acceptance heat-compati-
bility test on flight hardware to kill the encapsulated burden.
We use the component thermal analysis information and test
data to feed back into our system analysis to predict the response
of these components at the system level. We then built and tested
a Thermal Effects Test Model which is a simulated Viking lander
with non-functional components tO verify that the system thermal
analysis and the component analysis which were performed previously
are in fact correct.
Finally, we test our qualification vehicle which is called
the Proof Test Capsule, refine our thermal test data and, qualify
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the cycle to be used during the terminal sterilization process
for the flight landers.
We have completed the Thermal Effects Test Model testing.
The results gathered during that test are shown in Figure 9-19.
There is an engineering constraint of forty-hour time-at-tempera-
ture maximum after the first component reaches its lower flight
acceptance level temperature. The camera was the component which
reached its lower flight acceptance level temperature first. There
are many components which reached ii0 _ to 113 _ before the camera
did, however, their flight acceptance level temperature require-
ments are higher and did not constitute start of the cycle.
The slowest responding component during this test was the
biology mechanical subsystem, and it achieved the terminal steril-
ization temperature at approximately twenty-four to twenty-five
hours after start of ramp-up. There is a 2.4 hour internal lag in
the biology instrument between the exterior of the case and the
coldest point in the instrument. Since our approach is to place
the burden at the coldest responding point in the vehicle and
sterilize to that response we must incorporate this 2.4-hour lag
time before we can start counting lethality.
As I stated earlier, lethality can't be counted until the
humidity requirement is met. On the first cycle this time was
approximately twenty-nine hours into the cycle. Therefore, any
integration of lethality earlier had to be excluded. The purge
rate on the first cycle was 2.75 scfm. Analyses were performed to
determine if an increased purge rate would shorten this time. Dur-
ing the second cycle on the Thermal Effects Test Model we increased
the purge rate to 4.75 scfm. The humidity requirement was achieved
in approximately ten hours. However, there was some question as
to whether this shortening of time was actually due to the in-
creased purge rate or that we had heated the vehicle for a second
time. We postulated that if we maintained a purge rate of 4.75 scfm,
we could probably expect a worst-case situation of approximately
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twenty-five hours, therefore, to achieve the required kill to
meet the planetary quarantine and biology requirements would
require forty-two hours heating time from the start of heat-up
to the start of ramp-down.
The next view graph* will show you a picture of the Thermal
Effects Test Model used during this testing. The TETM's very simi-
lar in nature to a flight-type Viking Lander, however, it had
thermal simulator instead of functional components. As you will
see later, the information we gathered from this vehicle was quite
similar to that gathered on the Proof Test Capsule.
Here is another picture* of the TETM inside the sterilization
chamber with the bioshield inflated. The vehicle that you just
saw in the previous view graph now is enclosed in the aeroshell
base cover and bioshield. The bioshield is inflated to a mini-
mum of five inches of water pressure during terminal sterilization,
and this picture was taken through the window of the oven during
the actual sterilization process.
The next vehicle we have sterilization testing on is the
Proof Test Capsule. The objectives of this testing are shown in
Figure 9-20 and were completed earlier this year. Results are
plotted on Figure 9-21.
The radar altimeter electronics was the first component to
reach temperature. Camera number two got up to its lower flight
acceptance temperature first, however, it was only the exterior
of the insulation and thermal concluded that the interior of the
camera, or the electronics had not reached temperature yet, so
therefore, we were able to extend the cycle start time by approxi-
mately an hour. The radar altimeter electronics reached its lower
flight acceptance level temperature in approximately eleven hours.
Again, as with TETM, the biology mechanical subsystem was the
slowest responding component in the vehicle.
* Not available for inclusion in these proceedings
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We had a great deal more information when we conducted this
test than we did on TETM. We had microbiological sampling data
gathered during the assembly of the vehicle. We had the TETM
experience and had gained a great deal of knowledge from the
time that we had heated the TETM until we heated the Proof Test
Capsule.
We calculated the lethality required to satisfy both plane-
tary quarantine and biology requirements, and based on these cal-
culations, vehicle was ramped down at 46.2 hours after the start
of heating. The humidity requirement was achieved at 25.17 hours.
Here is an earlier picture* of the Proof Test Capsule. As
you can see, many of the components do look different from those
you saw on the Thermal Effects Test Model. These are functional
components. There were some simulators but very few.
In summary, Figure 9-22, we have taken the requirements which
have been imposed on us by the Viking Project Office and by NASA
Headquarters, and converted these into engineering requirements.
We have imposed these requirements and constraints on ourselves
and our suppliers, and have been able to produce hardware which
will satisfy these constraints. The hardware has been de-
signed and developed. Our thermal data base has been established,
both from the component and system thermal analysis work, from the
Thermal Effects Test Model data and now from the Proof Test Cap-
sule data. We have designed, built, and tested a sterilizable
vehicle which satisfies planetary quarantine.
(Mr. Toms opened the session to questions to any of the
three prior speakers.)
MR. T. C. HENDRICKS: I have a question, I guess for Dr.
Howell, and that is: Previously we saw estimates of the cost im-
pact of getting this planetary quarantine requirement on th_probe.
I was wondering if, in the earlier days of Viking, you made these
*Notavailable for inclusion in these proceedings
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SUMMARY
Requirements and Constraints Established and Imposed
Hardware Designed and De,veloped
Thermal Data Base Established
Component Verification of Thermal Data Base Completed
System Verification of Thermal Data Base Complete on TETM
Qualification with PTC Completed
Figure 9-22. Summary
cost estimates and now that you are almost done with your pro-
gram, how close were you able to make these estimates, how good
were the cost estimates?
DR. HOWELL: Well that is very difficult to say because from
Viking we have not really sat down and separated out all of the
costs that have been associated with planetary quarantine. There
was a decision early in the project not to do this. The costs
associated with some of these things are very easy to obtain, like
the cost of developing the bioshield, et cetera. Some of the
costs associated with the selection of hardware and so forth be-
come very difficult, become very program dependent and there was
a conscious decision made early in the Viking project not to track
the specific costs associated with planetary quarantine. So it's
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very difficult, if not impossible, to answer your question
because I don't know what the actual costs were or have been
associated with planetary quarantine on the Viking Project.
MR. TOMS: Dan Herman made a comment in the introductory
session that for the outer-planet program, for the outer-planet
probes, we would not include planetary quarantine in our present
thinking. And I asked him the other day if he could give me
more justification than just a whim on that. He says that there
is a letter in existence - many of you may know of this - letter
that was written to the Space Science Board (in fact it was more
in the form of a paper by Dick Goody and Leibowitz and Others)
that, in fact, made such a recommendation, and I think that was
done more than a year ago. Until that is acted upon by the Space
Science Board, it does at least give us a reason for working on
the assumption that perhaps planetary quarantine for the outer-
planet probes and for the outer-planet spacecraft wouldn't be
necessary.
Of course, it is not only the probes themselves but the
overall mission design, including such things as the economics
of using a bus deflection maneuver and then not sterilizing the
bus. They are all part of the same quarantine problem.
MR. DEFREES: What class clean rooms do you use for assembly
and test operations?
DR. HOWELL:
orbiter.
I'll let A1 Hoffman from JPL talk about the
For the lander we use a class one hundred thousand clean room
environment for the assembly and testing of the Viking lander.
MR. DEFREES: Bob, do you use anything more stringent than
that for components?
DR. HOWELL: No, Sir.
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MR. DEFREES: You use the one hundred thousand throughout?
DR. HOWELL: In some cases the component assembly areas are
equal to or less than a hundred thousand. In some cases we don't
even require a hundred thousand environment for the assembly of
the components. The basic requirement, for component assembly,
is dictated by the functional requirements of that component.
If, in fact, there are functional reasons why it should be assem-
bled in a very clean environment, then it will be. So the com-
ponent assembly spans a range from not fitting into one of the
federal standards, 209(a) or (b), categories, to a flat one hun-
dred.
MR. TOMS: Fine, well, I think we'll close that subject.
Some of the authors have brought copies of papers with them.
There are not enough to make a general distribution of them, but
you can ask the authors themselves for copies, if you are in-
terested.
MR. HYDE: Yes, I have a question. AI, would you sum up for
me in one sentence your posture about the outer planets, on just
the quarantine?
MR. HOFFM3hN: On the Quarantine? I think there are considerable
unknowns. As far as long-term planning, the picture is cloudy, as
to the degree of stringency of the planetary quarantine and steril-
ization requirements. I feel that as long as there are biologists
that are interested in exobiology for the outer planets, there
will be some sort of quarantine constraint. The degree of that
is unclear at this point. I think we would be amiss at this early
stage in our planning to completely neglect it. We should factor
it into some of our thinking. And, we have a good basis to start
from, our Pioneer, Mariner and Viking experience.
MR. HYDE: I want to expand my question just to say outer
planets and all their satellites?
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MR. HOFFMAN: Yes, as you are well aware, Titan is of con-
siderably more interest than some of the primaries. And the
problem that I was addressing earlier, the reduction in the
stringency of the sterilization requirements because of entry
heating, may be going for us at Titan. Titan may be, indeed, the
one that will dominate our sterilization and quarantine.
MR. KANE CASANI (JPL) : The thing I was going to say that
I think is important is that your point is well taken, that we
ought to assume that there is going to be some quarantine require-
ments and _hether or not those requirements have to be satisfied
by actually heat sterilizing the probe is the uncertainty. In
other words, it is on these that we can satisfy the requirements
without having to heat sterilize the probe and in some cases we
may have to heat sterilize. That is the thing that I think is
of general interest here. I think we are certainly going to
have the requirements.
MR. HOFFMAN: Yes, that point is well made.
J. HYDE: I would only add to that the question of the bus
deflection maneuver versus the probe deflection maneuver. It is
a crucial issue in this whole thing. If we have to turn around
and make the probes, intelligent probes, capable of doing their
own deflection, we are not talking about the same kind of probes
we have been talking about the last couple of days. We are not
talking about the same kind of money. So I think maybe you should
start looking at the numbers game on this whole thing. Pay
attention to the implications of putting a requirement on the
probe to do thedeflection maneuver. If you do that, I think we
may be out of business.
MR. HOFFMAN: Let me make a comment relative to that first,
Jim. I think, as you are well aware, up until 1971 there was an
unwritten policy in the United States that bus deflection was not
a mode that would be used for planetary missions. Then, after
that time, if we can demonstrate that the planetary quarantine
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requirements can be satisfied using a bus deflection, that mode
is an option that's available to us. And that is NASA policy.
One concern relative to that is to demonstrate four or five nines
reliability. Many of us get a little uneasy when we must
demonstrate reliability greater than two or three nines with that
type of operation. But I think it's a problem that can be addressed
and worked.
MR. SEIFF: This will agree a little bit with what you said
about the gravity of the change in the probe if the probe has to
be deflected. Earlier studies have been performed based on
that presumption that this was the way that it was to be done and
it doesn't have as major an impact on the probe design as you
are suggesting.
MR. HYDE: I don't agree with that at all, because I don't
think that we are talking about probes in the price category that
we have been discussing. If we have to talk about the intelligence
required to perform the attitude stabilization maneuver and the
deflection maneuver on the probe, I don't think we are talking
about the same kind of numbers.
MR. SEIFF: I think the system that you are envisioning is
more complex than what is needed to do the job.
MR. HYDE: Well, the issue is going to be bucks. And that is
what we've got to address here. What I am trying to poke at is
the money that is going to be associated with the impact on the
design activity related to incorporating that capability into the
probe, and I don't think we want to do that.
MR. TOMS: Let's hear from Bob DeFrees.
MR. DEFREES: I was going to make the same comment that A1
just made to Jim relative to the NASA policy that is written into
one of the specifications that the bus deflection is an acceptable,
in fact, the preferred method of entry. The only thing you have
to do is guarantee the probability or reliability of those things
IX-42
are at least as good, and that means, essentially, a reliability
of 10-4, that it will not contaminate the planet with the bus.
With redundancy, that is fairly easy to accomplish. But I just
wanted to interject that.
MR. SEIFF: The only thing I would like to emphasize in
closing the discussion is there are studies on the record in
which probe deflection maneuvers have been incorporated as part
of the study. And I was just looking around the room to try to
find some of the older characters who might have been involved
in this; Steve Georgiev, for one. He did a study on a Mars probe
that dates back about eight years, by now, I guess, in which that
was considered to be the standard approach and it doesn't throw
the kind of major monkey wrench into the works that has been sug-
gested here.
MR. HYDE: We might want to take this up outside of this room.
I think I need a parting comment too. We are not talking about
studies, we are talking about MJU '79 with a probe. We have got to
look at the problem of the bus-deflection maneuver, the reliability
of that relative to the quarantine, very specifically. I think the
cost...
MR. SEIFF: I don't disagree with that, that is fine.
MR. TOMS: Dan Herman wants both JPL and Ames to look more
closely at the quarantine problem during the coming months and, of
course, we are trying to get Larry Hall and his group back at Head-
quarters to bring the whole issue to a head, get a ruling on it we
can live with, and go ahead from there. It's going to be quite a
change of pace.
Now to the other design problems we want to talk about. We
have two papers that include discussion of radiation effects. The
speaker I want to bring up now is going to talk about not only ra-
diation effects but also long-life batteries. These are two of
the problem areas that he has been looking at. Lloyd Thayne from
Martin Marietta Corporation.
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